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Abstract
This paper extends the model originally proposed by Berton and Garibaldi
[2006] to undirected search on the side of the workers and shows that in
equilibrium higher ows of workers into temporary jobs - with respect to
ows into permanent jobs - are compatible with any stock of temporary
employment, the latter depending crucially on the probability of a per-
manent adverse shock. This implication of the model may explain why
in countries like Italy temporary employment did not absorb the entire
workforce, despite the turnover of workers on permanent jobs and the high
ows into temporary ones.
 Key words: matching models, temporary jobs
1 Introduction
During the late eighties and the early nineties reducing the employment protec-
tion legislation (EPL) became the main policy recipe for countries with a poor
labor market performance [Imf 1999, Oecd 1994]; the models were the US under
Reagans government and the UK under Thatchers. Many countries accepted
this idea of exibility, but for reasons going from the need of an agreement with
the unions, to the willingness of not losing support from a large proportion of
the workers or simply the preference for a milder reform strategy, they did not
proceed to a sharp reduction of the EPL on incumbent workers, often employed
with standard open-ended contracts. Instead, labor market reforms in the last
fteen years mainly occurred through the liberalization at the margin of tem-
porary jobs. This fact is witnessed by a widespread reduction of the EPL index
for xed-term contracts, while the same index for standard workers remained
basically unchanged (gures 1 and 2).
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Figure 1: EPL index for standard workers [Brandt et al. 2005]
Policy analysts wonder whether the share of temporary workers will go on
growing as the stock of open-ended contracts dies out due to natural turnover,
eventually absorbing the entire workforce. This is what actually happens in the
pure demand-setting model proposed by Boeri and Garibaldi [2007], where no
permanent vacancy is posted in equilibrium, or, similarly, in Cahuc and Postel-
Vinay [2002] and Blanchard and Landier [2002], where only ad hoc assumptions
allow the coexistence of temporary and permanent jobs. The evidence that the
share of temporary contracts is higher and growing in countries where the EPL
for standard workers is stricter [Booth et al. 2002] seems to conrm this idea.
However, a growing share of temporary workers may be just an o¤-equilibrium
outcome. Alonso-Borrego et al. [2005] as well as Berton and Garibaldi [2006],
for instance, clearly show that temporary and permanent jobs may coexist in
equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to go further into this topic, extending
the model proposed by Berton and Garibaldi to undirected search on the side of
the workers and showing that not only the coexistence of temporary and perma-
nent workers is possible in equilibrium, but also that a higher ow of temporary
vacancies - with respect to the ow of permanent ones - is compatible with a
higher stock of permanent workers. Next section depicts some descriptive ev-
idence about the Italian labor market. Section three describes the model and
section four discusses the results and draws some concluding remarks.
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Figure 2: EPL index for temporary workers: 1993-2003 [Brandt et al. 2005]
2 Flows and stocks of temporary jobs in Italy
Following a pure demand setting approach, temporary jobs should step by step
crowd out permanent jobs, eventually absorbing the entire workforce. The speed
of substitution should be proportional to standard workersturnover: the larger
is the turnover on workers under an open-ended contract, the larger should be
the ows into temporary employment.
Contrary to what is commonly known, Italy has always had quite a exible
labor market. The gross workersturnover (gure 3) was already high during late
eighties - i.e. before the main labor market reforms took place - and comparable
to the one observed, for instance, in the US [Contini and Revelli 1997]. This also
results in the low EPL index depicted in gure 1. One would therefore expect
sizeable ows into temporary employment during and after the liberalization of
temporary contracts, and this is actually the case: the ratio between the yearly
ow into xed-duration jobs and the yearly ow into open-ended ones grew
from 88% to 107% in the period 1998-20031 , i.e. immediately after a major
labor market reform was introduced and right before a further liberalization
of temporary contracts was enforced2 . However, during the same period the
proportion of temporary employment on total employment grew only slightly,
1WHIP data.
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Figure 3: Gross workersturnover in Italy: 1985-2003 [Berton et al. 2009]
passing from 8,6% to 9,9% and reaching 13,2% in 20073 . In other words, rms
still post open-ended vacancies and temporary employment will almost surely
not absorb the entire workforce4 .
In what follows I extend the model proposed by Berton and Garibaldi [2006]
to indirect search on the side of the workers and show that the basic results (i.e.
the trade-o¤ between the waiting time and the protability of a labor market
position, and the coexistence of open-ended and temporary contracts) still hold;
in addition, I prove that higher ows into temporary employment - with respect
to standard employment - are compatible with lower stocks.
3 The model
3.1 The matching framework
The model goes as follows:
3Eurostat data.
4This fact is even more evident when looking at Spanish data: during the nineties 90%
of new hires have been signed under temporary contracts [Dolado et al. 2002] but the share
of temporary employment on total employment is around 33% at least since 1996 (Eurostat
data).
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 The labor market consists of a mass one of homogeneous risk neutral
workers. Workers are either employed or unemployed: employed workers
are subject to natural turnover and separate from their job at rate s;
unemployed workers search for a new job and receive the unemployment
benet b.
 Firms post either temporary or permanent vacancies (respectively denoted
by subscripts t and p) whose ow cost is c, and produce with a constant
returns to scale technology with labor productivity yh. Temporary work-
ers can be laid o¤ at will, while rms that hire workers on permanent
arrangements must rely on natural turnover to downsize.
 Conditional on a permanent adverse technological shock, labor productiv-
ity falls to yl; shocks occur at rate .
 Both temporary and permanent workers receive an exogenous wage w.
In order to make things interesting, I assume that yh > w > yl; this
assumption is aimed to mimic what happens in the countries where the
dismissal of permanent workers cannot occur at will: upon the arrival of a
negative shock, rms are forced to ine¢ ciently retain them and to rely on
temporary workers in order to adjust the employed workforce. In addition,
I assume that w > b so that any job (temporary or permanent) is viable
for each worker.
 Unemployed workers search both for permanent and for temporary jobs.
The meeting of unemployed workers and unlled vacancies is described
by the matching functions m(u; vi) where u is the measure of unemplyed
workers and vi is the measure of vacancies of type i 2 fp; tg. Following
standard assumptions, m(:) is concave and homogeneous of degree one in
(u; vi) with continuous derivatives.
 The transition rate from unemployment to a job of type i is dened by
hi = m(u; vi)=u = m(1; i) = h(i) and the job lling rate for a vacancy
of type i is dened by qi = m(u; vi)=vi = m(1=i; 1) = q(i); the arrival











 Upon their meeting, unemployed workers and vacant rms x the wage
for the entire working relationship. In the spirit of Hall [2005], any wage





Unemployed workers search at the same time for both permanent and temporary
jobs. The Bellman equation of being unemployed therefore reads
rU = b+ h(p)[Ep   U ] + h(t)[Et   U ] (1)
On the contrary, the ow value of being employed with a permanent or a tem-
porary job di¤er insofar as the latter implies a higher job destruction rate
rEp = w + s[U   Ep] (2)
rEt = w + (s+ )[U   Et] (3)
Using (2) and (3) eventually combined with (1) and after a few steps of




and that Et =
w + (s+ )U
r + s+ 
where
U =
b(r + s+ ) + w[h(p)+ h(t)]
r[(r + s+ ) + h(p)+ h(t)]
3.2.2 Firms
Firms may post either permanent or temporary vacancies. When a vacancy is
lled with a permanent contract, the rm enjoys an operational prot equal to
yh   w as long as the labor productivity is high; conditional on a technological
shock, the rm has to ine¢ ciently retain the worker until her position quits
due to natural turnover and runs a loss equal to yl   w. Thus, the ow values
for a rm of a permanent job when the productivity is high (yh) or low (y)
respectively read
rJhp = yh   w + s[Vp   Jhp ] + [J lp   Jhp ] (4)
rJ lp = yl   w + s[Vp   J lp] (5)
Keeping open a permanent vacancy implies a ow cost c and its Bellman equa-
tion is
rVp =  c+ q(p)[Jhp   Vp]
Assuming free entry in the labor market, the equilibrium value of a permanent





which means that the ow cost of keeping open a permanent vacancy is equal,
in equilibrium, to its expected benet. Using Vp = 0 with (4) and (5) one gets





r + s+ 
+
(yl   w)





On the other hand when a vacancy is lled with a temporary worker the
rm maximizes the prot and does not run any operational loss, since upon the
occurrance of a productivity shock temporary jobs are quitted; their ow value
for a rm thus reads
rJht = yh   w + (s+ )[Vt   Jht ] (6)
Similarly, the Bellman equation for a temporary vacancy is
rVt =  c+ q(t)[Jht   Vt]





Using Vt = 0 with (6) also the expression for Jht is done
Jht =
yh   w
r + s+ 
> Jhp
3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is given by the couple fp; tg, the exogenous wage w and a
distribution of workers across the three labor market states (unemployment,
employment with a temporary job, employment with a permanent job). The
equilibrium values for p and t are completely determined by the behaviour of
the rms through optimal vacancy posting; indeed, free entry drives the value
of any vacancy to zero
Vp = Vt = 0






i.e. the expected benet of keeping open a vacancy is in equilibrium equal for
both permanent and temporary positions. Now, since Jhp < J
h
t it must be that
q(p) > q(t) and that p < t. As in Berton and Garibaldi [2006] the labor
market tightness for temporary jobs is thus higher; from the rmsstandpoint
this means that
Claim 1 Once a vacancy is lled, temporary jobs allow to make higher prots;
however, since the job lling rate for temporary vacancies is lower, temporary
vacancies need to be kept open longer, which implies a higher cost.
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Analogously, from the workerspoint of view
Claim 2 A permanent job is ex-post strictly better, since it prevents a worker
to be dismissed in case of a productivity shock. However, since the nding rate
is higher for temporary job than for permanent ones, a worker looking for a
permanent position has to stay unemployed longer.
Thus, allowing unemployed workers to search for both temporary and perma-
nent jobs at the same time does not a¤ect these two main features of Bertons
and Garibaldis model. In addition, it leads to a brand new result; indeed,






) vp < vt
i.e. in equilibrium
Claim 3 The ow of temporary vacancies is higher than the ow of permanent
vacancies.
The description of the steady state is completed by the distribution of work-
ers across labor market states. In equilibrium the ows in and out each of them
must be zero
_u = snp + (s+ )nt   h(p)u  h(t)u = 0
where the dotted variables stand for their time-derivatives and np and nt are
the stocks of workers respectively employed with a permanent and a temporary
contract. Rearranging terms and using u+ np + nt = 1 one gets
u =
s+ nt
s+ h(p) + h(t)
(7)
The expression for the ow of workers in and out permanent and temporary
jobs in turn read








Combining equations (7) and (9) and after a few steps of algebra one gets
the expression for the stock of unemployed workers
u =
s(s+ )
(s+ )[s+ h(p)] + sh(t)
(10)
Substituting (10) into (8) and (9) also the expressions for the stocks of perma-
nent and temporary employed workers can be obtained
np =
(s+ )h(p)





(s+ )[s+ h(p)] + sh(t)
(12)
The comparison between (11) and (12) leads to a second major result of this
paper
Claim 4 Even if rms post a higher number of temporary vacancies, the equi-
librium stock of temporary jobs may be above as well as below the equilibrium
stock of permanent jobs.
Their proportion crucially depends on the relative strength of the job nding
rates h(i) and of the probability of a negative productivity shock. The higher
is , the higher is the destruction rate of temporary jobs and - in a framework
where rms are forward-looking - the lower is their share on total employment.
4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper extends the model originally proposed by Berton and Garibaldi
[2006] by allowing the workers to search for both permanent and temporary
jobs at the same time when unemployed. The basic results of the original
model still hold and temporary and pemanent jobs coexisit in the view of a
trade-o¤ between the waiting time needed to ll a vacancy (or to nd a job) of
the desired type and the protability of that position. In addition, this paper
shows that a higher ow of new temporary vacancies - with respect to the ow of
permanent ones - is compatible in equilibrium with any stock of permanent jobs:
in a forward-looking setting the equilibrium proportion of temporary workers
crucially depends on the probability of a permanent adverse shock; the more
likely is the shock, the lower is the share of temporary jobs. Such implication
may possibly explain why in countries like Italy and Spain the share of tempo-
rary workers remained stable despite the extremely high ows of workers into
temporary employment.
Three issues need some further comment. First of all, the model I propose
here does not explain how the workers sort into the di¤erent types of jobs; given
the shorter unemployment duration for workers who accept a temporary job
o¤er, the introduction of heterogeneity in terms of o¤-the-job options would
drive the workers with lower assets into temporary employment, as in Alonso-
Borrego et al. [2005] and Berton and Garibaldi [2006]. Second, in the model I
propose here the wage is exogenous; this simplifying assumption is nonetheless
consistent with what happens in countries like Italy, where the wage is almost
completely determined by collective bargaining. Finally, in my view the fact that
high ows of workers into temporary jobs will not necessarily absorb the whole
workforce does not mean that the issue is somehow less relevant. Temporary
employment is often associated with job insecurity [Clark and Postel-Vinay
2005] and poor human capital investments [Bassanini et al. 2005], and in many
cases also with lower wages and low transition rates into more stable jobs [De
Graaf-Zijl 2005]. In Italy - but also in deeply di¤erent countries like the US
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[Mishel et al. 2007] - these facts are exacerbated by a lower access to income-
maintenance schemes [Berton et al. 2009]. The individual sustainability of the
"cost of exibilization" thus depends on temporary workerscareers dynamics
and on the social protection they are eligible to, which has little to do with the
overall proportion of temporary employment.
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